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Abstract
We study traffic networks with multiple origin-destination pairs, relaxing the simplifying assumption
of agents having complete knowledge of the network structure. We identify a ubiquitous class of networks,
i.e., rings, for which we can safely increase the agents’ knowledge without affecting their own overall
performance – known as immunity to Informational Braess’ Paradox – closing a gap in the literature.
We also extend our performance measure to include the welfare of all agents, showing that under this
measure IBP is a widespread phenomenon and no network is immune to it.
1 Introduction
With the rising popularity of GPS route-guidance systems, many travellers rely on information about route
choice to help them make decisions. It is natural to assume that more information about paths available to
a driver would only reduce their expected journey time. However, this is has been shown not to be the case,
due to a phenomenon called informational Braess’ paradox [1]: as presenting new options can change the
decision-making of some self-interested agents, this can cause an overall re-routing which makes them worse
off.
Congestion games are the standard framework in AI and, more specifically, algorithmic game theory to
study the equilibria of traffic flows. These are non-cooperative game where self-interested actors choose sets
of available resources, where the cost of each resource depends on its overall usage. In the traffic-specific
Wardrop model [19], resources form an undirected network in which the players wish to travel between origin
and destination nodes, and the cost of each edge often represents expected travel time. Rational players
seek to minimise their overall cost by selecting the appropriate path. All players have an origin-destination
(OD) pair which corresponds to the nodes they wish to travel between and players with the same OD pair
are grouped into populations.
It is likely that travel costs will change over time such as road improvements or temporary construction
works. Braess’ paradox (BP) [4] occurs when the cost of a resource is reduced but the total cost to the
population increases. BP assumes the state of the system is a user equilibrium (or Wardrop equilibrium);
where every player has minimised personal costs of travel given the actions of others. BP is based on
the assumption that agents have complete information about the network structure. But this assumption
is often not met in practical situation, where actors typically have bounded knowledge of their available
paths. Recently, information constrained user equilibrium (ICUE) [1] has been introduced, where each
player minimises their travel costs given their information set (edges of the network). The equilibrium is
reached through one-step improvements and gives rise to informational Braess’ paradox (IBP) which occurs
when a user’s cost at ICUE increases as a result of their information set expanding.
ICUE is a significantly more realistic tool to predict traffic flows, but the study of equilibria in congestion
games with incomplete information is still at its infancy. In particular, while the relationship between
network structure and immunity to IBP has been characterised for single-population congestion games [1],
for the more complex and realistic multi-population variant the exact conditions are unknown. On top of
that IBP has only been formulated looking at one group, i.e., the one that acquires new knowledge, but not
at the welfare of all agents, which is the more social cost metric used for congestion games in general.
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Our contribution. In this paper we advance the analysis of congestion games played by heterogenous
boundedly rational agents, in two important ways: first, we establish how a ubiquitous class of networks,
rings, are immune to IBP, settling a conjecture in [1]. Second, we extend the analysis of IBP to take into
account the welfare of all agents, rather than only a group of them, showing that under this measure IBP is
a widespread phenomenon and no network is immune to it. Our analysis is an important first step for the
design of road systems that do not penalise the acquisition of new knowledge, while establishing that such
events do have consequences for the system as a whole.
Related Literature. Since the seminal work by Braess [4], the topic of routing paradoxes has been a topic
extensively studied [14, 21]. Congestion games appear often in transportation systems [8, 16, 20, 21] but
they also apply to a wide variety of real-world systems, with important applications to telecommunication
[15] and electrical networks [17].
Pas and Principio [16] classified demand constraints and linear cost functions that cause Braess’ paradox in
traffic games on Braess-like networks. Milchtaich [13] singled out the topological conditions for an undirected
network to be immune to Braess’ paradox for a single population. More generally, Epstein et al. [7] considered
topologies in which every Nash equilibrium is socially optimal. In asymmetric games, conditions for network
immunity to Braess’ paradox was found by Chen et al. [5]. More recently, Fujishige et al. [9] proved
the sufficient combinatorial property of strategy spaces for nonatomic congestion games for which Braess’
paradox cannot occur, to be those with matroid bases.
Player heterogeneity has been a topic of much interest, e.g., through player-specific resource cost functions
[12] representing varied preferences [6] or uncertainties [3, 18], while more complex models may consider
driver’s uncertainties over road conditions or demand [11]. There is evidence that providing incomplete
information to drivers about road capacities may be worse than providing no information at all [2]. Along
the same line, Liu et al. [10] studied heterogeneity among players regarding the quality of information
they receive and how that affects the equilibrium costs. The informational Braess’ paradox was posed by
Acemoglu et al. [1] for differing levels of information about possible paths. They classified network topologies
as immune to this when considering a single OD pair, and show examples of networks that have immunity
in the asymmetric game.
Paper Structure. Section 2 presents the preliminary notions and definitions needed for our results. Sec-
tion 3 proves that multi-population congestion games on ring networks will not allow travellers acquiring
knowledge to be negatively impacted by information. A variant of performance measure, i.e., social cost, is
posed in Section 4, which induces losses in utility by some agent independently of the network topology. We
conclude discussing future research directions.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Congestion Games
Let N = {1, ..., n} be a nonempty finite set of agents populations. In each population, we suppose there
exists heterogeneity among knowledge of the resources (due to previous experience, use of GPS systems etc.),
i.e., Ki ≥ 1 information types of players in each population i. We refer to a player from population i of
type k as (i, k), which we abbreviate ik, where the demand for a type, i.e., the traffic rate associated to that
population, is dik ≥ 0.
Each population has a nonempty finite resource set Ei, where information types can restrict such knowl-
edge, i.e., each population-type pair is associated to a known set Eik ⊆ Ei. We assume that each Ei is made
of relevant resources, i.e., those which are used in at least one strategy, and that strategy sets Sik ⊆ 2Eik
only contain resources from their information set and are disjoint for distinct populations. Denote E as the
irredundant resource set E =
⋃
i∈N Ei. Finally, resource cost functions ce : R≥0 → R≥0 ∪ {∞} such that
e ∈ E are assumed to be continuous, non-decreasing and non-negative. Formally, a nonatomic congestion
game is defined as a tuple M = (N, (Ki), (Eik), (Sik), (ce)e∈E , (dik)), with i ∈ N and ik ∈ Ki.
The outcome of all players of type (i, k) choosing strategies leads to a strategy distribution xik satisfying∑
sik∈Sik x
ik
sik
= dik and x
ik
sik
≥ 0, ∀sik ∈ Sik. A strategy distribution or outcome x = (xik){i∈N, k∈Ki} is
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Figure 1: Braess’ paradox on the Wheatstone network. When d = 1, the social cost of travel is 3
2
before and 2 after
reducing the costs of the middle edge.
feasible if
∑
sik∈Sik x
ik
sik
= dik, ∀i ∈ N, k ∈ Ki. For the rest of the paper we focus, without loss of generality,
on feasible strategies.
Denote the load on e in an outcome x to be fe(x) =
∑
i∈N
∑
si∈Si χ{e∈si}x
i
si . In x, a player from
population i receives a cost function C(sik,x) = Cik(sik,x) =
∑
e∈sik ce(fe(x)) when selecting strategy
sik ∈ Sik.
An information constrained user equilibrium (ICUE) is a strategy distribution x such that every player
of every population chooses a strategy with minimum cost: ∀i ∈ N, k ∈ Ki and strategies sik, s′ik ∈ S(i,k)
such that xisik > 0 we have Cik(sik,x) ≤ Cik(s′ik,x). The social cost is the total cost incurred to all players
SC(x) =
∑
i∈N
∑
k∈Ki Cik(x)dik.
Braess’ paradox is a phenomenon that arises when the cost of a resource is strictly decreased yet results in
a strict increase in the social cost of the equilibria. This is motivated by example shown on the Wheatstone
network in Figure 1.
Example 1. Consider a Wardrop traffic game as depicted in Figure 1. Suppose there is a single population
of unit size that wish to travel between nodes O and D. In the first instance of cost functions, any UE requires
that 12 choose the path {O, 1, D} and 12 choose the path {O, 2, D} generating a social cost of 32 . By reducing
the cost of an edge, the resulting UE requires that all players now choose to travel the path {O, 1, 2, D}. This
increases the social cost of the equilibrium to 2, despite only reducing the costs of edges.
A set of systems (E,Si)i∈N admits Braess’ paradox (BP) if there are two nonatomic congestion games
M = (N,E, (Si)i∈N , (ce)e∈E , (di)i∈N ) and M′ = (N,E, (Si)i∈N , (c′e)e∈E , (d′i)i∈N ) where c′e(t) ≤ ce(t) such
that ∀t ≥ 0 and d′i ≤ di, ∀i ∈ N , and two UE x and x′, such that SC(x) < SC(x′). If no such M and M′
exist, then we say that the network is immune to Braess’ paradox.
Informational Braess’ paradox (IBP) occurs when one player’s type has their information set expanded,
without loss of generality type (1, 1), and this paradoxically increases their strategy cost. More formally, IBP
occurs if there exists expanded information sets (E˜(i,k)){i∈N, k∈Ki} with E(1,1) ⊂ E˜(1,1) and E(i,k) = E˜(i,k)
for any (i, k) 6= (1, 1) with associated ICUE x and x˜ where the costs increase for the expanded information
player C(1,1)(x) < C(1,1)(x˜).
2.2 Graph Theory
A simple network G = (V,E) is an undirected graph with at most one edge between any pair of nodes and
no self-loops. A path is an ordered collection of edges such that adjacent pairs of edges share a node. If a
path visits no node more than once then it is called acyclic. A tree is a connected simple network that has
only acyclic paths. A ring is a network such that every node connects to exactly two others, forming a single
continuous loop.
A network congestion game is played on an undirected network G = (V,E), where the resources are
edges and players move between the distinct origin and destination terminal nodes Oi, Di ∈ V for any i ∈ N .
The strategies of players are paths where no vertex is visited more than once such that the start and end
nodes are the associated origin and destination. If a network is two-terminal then there is a single origin
and destination pair for players to travel between. An asymmetric or multi-population game is one in which
there are multiple OD pairs.
We say that a two-terminal network is linearly independent (LI) if each path has at least one edge that
does not belong to any other path. A network is series linearly independent (SLI) if and only if (i) it
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comprises a single LI network, or (ii) it is constructed by connecting two SLI networks in series. For two
SLI networks Gi and Gj , a coincident block is a common LI subnetwork of Gi and Gj with the same set
of terminal nodes. An embedding is a collection of injective maps from the sets of relevant resources to the
irredundant resources. For example, Figure 2 shows how the Wheatstone network is embedded in a grid
road system.
D
O
Figure 2: A Wheatstone network is embedded in any grid.
2.3 Immunity to IBP
The following theorems from the literature specify the known conditions for IBP to not occur. The first
result is for congestion games with only one population of players. For multiple populations, the conditions
for immunity to IBP are unknown, with Theorem 2 establishing a fairly direct sufficient condition for the
multi-population case.
Theorem 1. [1] A two-terminal network congestion game played on network G is immune to IBP if and
only if G is an SLI network.
Theorem 2. [1] For any asymmetric network congestion game on network G, where ∀i ∈ N Gi = (Vi, Ei)
is the relevant network, IBP does not occur if the following hold:
(a) ∀i ∈ N , Gi is SLI
(b) For all distinct i, j ∈ N , either Ei ∪ Ej = ∅, or Ei ∪ Ej consists of all coincident blocks of Gi and Gj.
Notice that the conditions from Theorem 2 do not depend on information restrictions. It does, however,
depend on the maximal information sets of populations which combine to form the relevant network.
3 Circuit games and IBP
In this section, we formally introduce circuits, most commonly found in matroid theory, for which immunity
to IBP is conjectured [1]. Consider a set system (E,C), where E is the set of resources and C ⊆ 2E , with
the following axioms:
• ∅ /∈ C;
• If C1, C2 ∈ C and C1 ⊆ C2, then C1 = C2,
• For any two distinct C1, C2 ∈ C such that e ∈ C1 ∩ C2, there is a member C3 ∈ C such that C3 ⊆
(C1 ∪ C2)\{e}.
Then C is a circuit over E. A circuit game is a congestion game in which every relevant network Gi = (Vi, Ei)
∀i ∈ N is a circuit. We now establish this useful lemma, whose proof we only sketch due to limitations of
space.
Proposition 1. A circuit game cannot exist on a network G that is not simple.
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose we have a network G that is not simple. Choose two nodes where there
exist multiple edges between them- e1, e2. Suppose a population i of players can use e1 in their strategy then
e2 ∈ Ei since they connect the same nodes. By definition of a circuit game, the relevant network of that
population must be a circuit Ci. We must have e1, e2 ∈ Ci. Consider C′i = {e1, e2}. It is a dependent set since
it is a cycle. Any of its proper subsets are independent, therefore, it is a circuit. By the axioms of circuits,
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if C′i ⊆ Ci then Ci = C′i. So the population i can only travel between the end nodes of e1 and e2. There
must exist another population j whose strategies also include e1 and e2 since otherwise, the congestion game
of populations N\{i} is an equivalent game (one with the same equilibria). Population j must also have a
relevant network that is a circuit and hence must travel on the circuit Cj = {e1, e2} = Ci. This implies that
the populations are indistinct which is a contradiction. Hence, G must be simple.
Proposition 1, notice, implies that any ring forms a circuit game. Now we prove the following:
Proposition 2. Any two-terminal circuit game is immune to IBP.
The proof of Proposition 2 follows from Theorem 1 since it can be shown, using Proposition 1, that a
circuit game network is SLI. This result confirms the current classification of IBP immunity from Theorem
2.
When considering multiple origin-destination pairs, the circuit axioms now apply to slightly more complex
structures than simple rings. A circuit games can comprise connected rings such that the OD pairs do not
allow for traversal between rings. Before we can prove the immunity to IBP for such structures, we pose
the more general statement that not all player types can be negatively impacted by a single information
expansion. We omit the proof for the general case, but we give the idea behind the proof technique and
present the full reasoning for the case of n = 2.
Proposition 3. Let M be an asymmetric circuit game and and let (E˜(i,k)){i∈N, k∈Ki} be expanded informa-
tion sets such that E(1,1) ⊂ E˜(1,1) and E(i,k) = E˜(i,k) for any (i, k) 6= (1, 1), wit associated ICUE x and x˜.
Then there exists at least one player type (i, k) i ∈ N, k ∈ Ki such that C(i,k)(x˜) ≤ C(i,k)(x).
Proof idea. In a circuit, we can show that each population has at most two strategies. Each population that
has only one strategy will not affect the equilibria before and after the information expansion, except the
type (1, 1) whose strategy set expands. So we can assume that for n populations there are at most n + 1
types. Since there are n populations with distinct OD pairs, the game must be embedded in a 2n-edge
circuit. Now if we compare the contradiction assumption for each of the types, we know that the strategy
the use before the expansion must have strictly less flow on at least one of the edges in the strategy than
afterwards. Now if we compare all n + 1 inequalities we will find that there is always a contradiction since
the demands of populations must be non-negative.
The following example shows the for the case where n = 2 as displayed in Figure 3.
O1
O2
D2
D1
e1 e2
e3 e4
Figure 3: A circuit with two populations.
Example 2. Let there be two populations each with distinct OD pairs as shown in Figure 3. Let the
strategy sets of player types: (1, 1) before S11 = {s1} and after expansion S˜11 = {s1, s2}, type (1, 2) has
strategies S12 = {s1, s2}, and type (2, 2) has S22 = {t1, t2}. The demands for these populations are d11 >
0, d12 ≥ 0, d22 > 0. In order to reach a contradiction, suppose that there does not exist such a player. Then
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, k ∈ Ki we have C(i,k)(x˜) > C(i,k)(x).
Consider the feasible strategy distributions x. Since type (1, 1) only has one strategy we have xs111 = d11.
In order for every player’s cost to increase, we must have that (1, 1) strictly prefers to deviate to the other
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strategy hence (1, 2) must choose s2. This gives us x
s2
12 = d12. Now suppose that (2, 2) plays x
t1
22 = pd22,
xt222 = (1− p)d22. The cost functions for the players are:
C11(x) = ce1(f1) + ce2(f2)
C12(x) = ce3(f3) + ce4(f4)
C22(x) =
{
ce1(f1) + ce3(f3) p ∈ [0, 1)
ce2(f2) + ce4(f4) p ∈ (0, 1]
where
f1 = d11 + (1− p)d22
f2 = d11 + pd22
f3 = d12 + (1− p)d22
f4 = d12 + pd22
Now consider the possible strategy distributions x˜. Without loss of generality, assume that both (1, 1) and
(1, 2) have the same strategy distribution. Consider the following strategy distribution for population 1:
x˜s11k = d1k, k ∈ {1, 2}. This could only be an ICUE if it was a dominant strategy given the total demand of
population 2, which we know is not true given the deviation from s1 in strategy distribution x. So we must
have x˜s11k = qd1k and x˜
s1
1k = (1 − q)d1k where k ∈ {1, 2} and q ∈ [0, 1). For population 2, let the strategy
distribution be xt122 = p˜d22, x
t2
22 = (1− p˜)d22. The cost functions after information expansion are:
C11(x˜) = ce3(f˜3) + ce4(f˜4)
C12(x˜) = ce3(f˜3) + ce4(f˜4)
C22(x˜) =
{
ce1(f˜1) + ce3(f˜3) p˜ ∈ [0, 1)
ce2(f˜2) + ce4(f˜4) p˜ ∈ (0, 1]
where
f˜1 = q(d11 + d12) + (1− p˜)d22
f˜2 = q(d11 + d12) + p˜d22
f˜3 = (1− q)(d11 + d12) + (1− p˜)d22
f˜4 = (1− q)(d11 + d12) + p˜d22
The contradiction assumption C11(x) < C11(x˜) gives us:
ce1(f1) + ce2(f2) < ce3(f˜3) + ce4(f˜4) ≤ ce1(f˜1) + ce2(f˜2)
Since cost functions are nondecreasing, this implies that we must have f1 < f˜1 or f2 < f˜2. In terms of
demands: (i) d11 + (1 − p)d22 < q(d11 + d12) + (1 − p˜)d22 or (ii) d11 + pd22 < q(d11 + d12) + p˜d22. If both
these hold, we have p˜+ (1−q)d11−qd12d22 < p and p˜+
(1−q)d11−qd12
d22
> p which leads to a contradiction.
The contradiction assumption for player type (1, 2), C12(x) < C12(x˜), leads to
ce3(f3) + ce4(f4) < ce3(f˜3) + ce4(f˜4)
By nondecreasing cost functions, we have (iii) d12 + (1− p)d22 < (1− q)(d11 + d12) + (1− p˜)d22 and/or (iv)
d12 + pd22 < (1 − q)(d11 + d12) + p˜d22. But notice that (i) and (iv) contradict each other, in addition (ii)
and (iii) contradict each other. So we either have both (i) and (iii) holding true, or the case where (ii) and
(iv) hold true. Inequality (iii) cannot hold unless (i) holds and (iv) cannot hold without (ii). So we either
need (i) or (ii) to hold.
Finally, consider C22(x) < C22(x˜). Consider the case where p, p˜ ∈ (0, 1). Then we must have
ce1(f1) + ce3(f3) < ce1(f˜1) + ce3(f˜3)
ce2(f2) + ce4(f4) < ce2(f˜2) + ce4(f˜4)
Similarly, by nondecreasing cost functions, we must have either (v) d11 + (1− p)d22 < q(d11 + d12) + (1−
p˜)d22 or (vi) d12+(1−p)d22 < (1−q)(d11+d12)+(1− p˜)d22. These are equivalent to (i) and (iii) respectively.
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It must also be true that at least one of d11+pd22 < (q(d11+d12)+p˜d22 or d12+pd22 < (1−q)(d11+d12)+p˜d22
is true. However, these are equivalent to (ii) and (iv) respectively. So this reaches a contradiction. 1
Now suppose p = [0, 1), p˜ ∈ [0, 1). Then we have:
ce1(f1) + ce3(f2) < ce1(f˜1) + ce3(f˜3)
So we have that (i) and (iii) hold. This gives us (1−q)d11−qd12d22 + p˜ < p which means p > 0 since d11, d22 > 0.
So p˜ = 0 otherwise we have the case as above. Now this implies that
ce2(f2) + ce4(f4) < ce2(f˜2) + ce4(f˜4)
This again will lead to a contradiction.
Now suppose p = (0, 1], p˜ ∈ (0, 1].
ce2(f2) + ce4(f4) < ce2(f˜2) + ce4(f˜4)
So we have that (ii) and (iv) hold. This gives us (1−q)d12−qd11d22 + p < p˜, using similar reasoning as above we
see that we must have p < 1 and p˜ = 1. But this tells us:
ce1(f1) + ce3(f3) < ce1(f˜1) + ce3(f˜3)
Hence, we reach a contradiction.
Now suppose p = [0, 1), p˜ = (0, 1]. Then we see that
ce1(f1) + ce3(f3) < ce1(f˜1) + ce3(f˜3)
So we must have that (i) and (iii) hold so we have (1−q)d11−qd12d22 + p˜ < p. Hence, we must have p, p˜ ∈ (0, 1)
which we have already shown to be contradictory.
Now suppose p = (0, 1], p˜ = [0, 1).
ce2(d11 + pd22) + ce4(d12 + pd22) < ce2(f˜2) + ce4(f˜4)
This implies (1−q)d11−qd12d22 + p < p˜ must hold which means that we have p, p˜ ∈ (0, 1) which leads to a
contradiction.
Now that we have shown that a circuit game will not increase all player’s costs from information distri-
bution simultaneously, we can prove that information cannot harm the player who receives it.
Theorem 3. Any circuit game is immune to IBP.
Proof. By the definition of IBP, there exists an information type whose information set expands. Assume
without loss of generality that type (1, 1) are those players with expanded information sets. To reach a
contradiction, assume that C(1,1)(x˜) > C(1,1)(x) where x and x˜ are the ICUEs reached before and after the
information set of type (1, 1) is expanded respectively.
Since each player’s relevant network is a circuit, the possible paths must be divided into the two directions
that one can travel around the circuit. By Proposition 1, there is only a single edge that can connect any
two nodes, so each population must have two linearly independent paths available to them. Player type
(1, 1) with restricted information set has only one possible path before expansion and player type (1, 2) has
two paths available to them, without loss of generality, S(1,1) = {sa} and S(1,2) = {sa, sb}.
For any two distinct i, j ∈ N , either Ei ∩ Ej = ∅ or Ei ∩ Ej = C. If E1 ∩ Ej = ∅ then we do not need
to consider population j as it will not affect the equilibrium costs of (1, 1). So assume that for all j ∈ N we
have E1 ∩ Ej = C. Now suppose that type kj ∈ Kj only has one choice of path. Then we can consider an
equivalent game where the costs of resources e ∈ E(j,kj) are increased to ce(fe(x) + djkj ). So we can assume
that for any j ∈ N\{1}, there exists only one information type (j, 2) where each player has full information
about relevant resources.
1Notice that d12 can be reduced from all inequalities so we can omit type (1, 2) and get the same result.
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If (1, 1) does not choose sb after the information set expansion then the ICUE remains unchanged and
we are done. So suppose we have x˜sb11 > 0 and x˜
sa
11 < x
sa
11 = d11.
Suppose that
∑
e∈sa fe(x˜) ≤
∑
e∈sa fe(x). If x˜
sa
11 = 0, then by definition of ICUE
∑
e∈sa ce(fe(x˜)) ≥∑
e∈sb ce(fe(x˜)) and otherwise, if x˜
sa
11 > 0 then
∑
e∈sa ce(fe(x˜)) =
∑
e∈sb ce(fe(x˜)). Then it follows that
C11(x˜) =
∑
e∈sb ce(fe(x˜)) ≤
∑
e∈sa ce(fe(x˜)) ≤
∑
e∈sa ce(fe(x)) = C11(x) since ce is continuous and non-
decreasing. Hence, a contradiction.
So it must be the case that
∑
e∈sa fe(x˜) >
∑
e∈sa fe(x). Any population k ∈ N\{1} has two possible
strategies that must contain elements from both sa and sb. For each k, we have corresponding strategies sk1
and sk2 .
We can divide the player types into two sets as follows A = {i ∈ N, j ∈ {1, 2} : Cij(x˜) > Cij(x)} and
B = {i ∈ N, j ∈ {1, 2} : Cij(x˜) ≤ Cij(x)}. By the contradiction assumption, A is not empty and using
Proposition 3 we know that B is nonempty.
All possible paths between any two nodes from the irredundant network Gˆ form the set S. Divide this into
two distinct sets as SA = {s ∈ S : C(s, x˜) > C(s,x)} and SB = {s ∈ S : C(s, x˜) ≤ C(s,x)}. Consequently,
we must have that maxs∈SA{C(s,x)− C(s, x˜)} < 0 and mins∈SB{C(s,x)− C(s, x˜)} ≥ 0.
Claim 1: If i ∈ A and s ∈ SB then xsi = 0.
This follows from C(s,x) ≥ C(s, x˜) by definition of SB . Then by definition of ICUE, C(s,x) ≥ Ci(x˜).
By definition of A, we must have Ci(x˜) > Ci(x). Hence, x
s
i = 0.
Claim 2: If i ∈ B and s ∈ SA then x˜si = 0.
This is true since C(s, x˜) > C(s,x) by definition of SB . By definition of ICUE, C(s,x) ≥ Ci(x). Finally,
by definition of A we must have Ci(x) > Ci(x˜). Hence, x˜
s
i = 0.
Let the demands for paths in SA and SB before and after information expansion be defined as dA =∑
s∈SA
∑
i∈N x
s
i , d˜A =
∑
s∈SA
∑
i∈N x˜
s
i , dB =
∑
s∈SB
∑
i∈N x
s
i , d˜B =
∑
s∈SB
∑
i∈N x˜
s
i . It follows from
Claims 1 and 2 that we have d˜A ≤ dA and d˜B ≥ dB . Since A and B are nonempty, it also follows that both
SA and SB are nonempty.
Claim 3: Let Sα, Sβ be any nonempty partition of S. If we have d˜α ≤ dα and d˜β ≥ dβ , then
max
s∈Sα
{C(s,x)− C(s, x˜)} ≥ min
s∈Sβ
{C(s,x)− C(s, x˜)} .
We will prove Claim 3 by induction on the number of edges and the number of populations. Start
with the base case of a circuit with three edges and one population. All possible paths of the network are
S = {e1, e2, e3, e1e2, e1e3, e2e3}. Suppose that without loss of generality the population’s strategy set is
S = {e1e2, e3} and their information set before expansion is E = {e1, e2}. We have a two-terminal game
that is SLI so by Theorem 2 it is immune to IBP. For any s ∈ S such that s /∈ S, s contributes no demand
to dα, d˜α, dβ , d˜β hence any such s can be randomly assigned to one of the sets Sα and Sα. Since e1e2 ∈ E,
the demand for this strategy can only reduce after the information expansion hence e1e2 ∈ Sα. The demand
for e3 can only increase after the information expansion so e3 ∈ Sβ . Since there is no IBP, we must have
C(e1e2,x) ≥
{
C(e1e2, x˜) if C(e1e2, x˜) ≤ C(e3, x˜)
C(e3, x˜) if C(e1e2, x˜) ≥ C(e3, x˜)
If C(e1e2, x˜) ≤ C(e3, x˜) then C(e1e2,x)−C(e1e2, x˜) ≥ 0. If C(e1e2, x˜) ≥ C(e3, x˜), then C(e3,x) ≤ C(e3, x˜)
as fe3(x) < fe3(x˜). Hence, maxs∈Sα {C(s,x)− C(s, x˜)} ≥ mins∈Sβ {C(s,x)− C(s, x˜)}.
Now consider a subdivision of this circuit. The same reasoning holds, hence it is true for a circuit with
any number of edges. Now we assume that Claim 3 is true for n−1 populations on a circuit with an arbitrary
number of edges. Now we will try to show how the addition of another population will not affect this property.
Suppose that the information of player type (1, 1) is the population with the expanded information set with
strategy sets before S˜11 = {sα, sβ}. If for any s ∈ S such that s /∈ S11 ∪ ... ∪ Sn2, then s contributes no
demand to dα, d˜α, dβ , d˜β and hence can be arbitrarily assigned to one of the sets Sα and Sβ . We can assume
C(sα,x) ≥ C(sβ ,x) since otherwise C(s,x)− C(s, x˜) = 0 ∀s ∈ S and Claim 3 is immediately true. Hence,
we know that the demand for sα will strictly reduce and the demand for sβ will strictly increase.
For any i ∈ {2, ..., n} let the strategy set be Si = {sαi, sβi}. It must be the case that ∀i ∈ {2, ..., n}
if demand for sαi increases then the demand for sβi must reduce. Suppose that ∃i ∈ {2, ..., n} such that
the demands for sαi, sβi remain the same, then we can play an equivalent game of n − 1 populations, for
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Figure 4: Evacuation of a sports stadium is immune to IBP.
which we assumed the claim to be true. So in each population, we must have a strict increase in demand
for one strategy and strict decrease for the other. Since we assumed d˜α ≤ dα and d˜β ≥ dβ and that both Sα
and Sβ are nonempty, in every possible allocation of strategies to Sα and Sβ there exists i ∈ {1, ..., n} such
that exactly one strategy of Si belongs to Sα. Hence, there always exists a population i ∈ {1, ..., n} whose
strategies belong in both Sα and Sβ . Without loss of generality, let the demand for sαi increase and belong
to Sα and demand for sβi reduce and belong to Sβ . Then we must have that Ci(sαi, x˜) ≤ Ci(sβi, x˜) and
Ci(sαi,x) ≥ Ci(sβi,x). Therefore we have Ci(sαi,x)− Ci(sαi, x˜) ≥ Ci(sβi,x)− Ci(sβi, x˜). This concludes
the induction step and so we have proved Claim 3.
Using the partition of SA and SB and the three claims, we have the contradiction:
0 > max
s∈SA
{C(s,x)− C(s, x˜)} ≥ min
s∈SB
{C(s,x)− C(s, x˜)} ≥ 0
Therefore, we have reached a contradiction.
An interesting application of this theorem is considering pedestrian exit-routing in sports stadiums, such
as in Figure 4. Suppose that player populations are those who are seated in the same block and wish to
use the same mode of transport. Knowledge of the layout can differ between people and can be distributed
through signs or movement restrictions provided by the stadium. If pedestrians are only allowed to exit their
seat block through a single exit, as in Figure 4, then the overlapping network of all populations is a ring.
Hence, information cannot harm the expected travel times of exiting the stadium. However, if visitors are
allowed to walk between seat blocks before exiting the stadium the network no longer has immunity to IBP.
These results should, therefore, have importance in planning evacuation routes.
4 IBP for Social Cost
Thus far, we define IBP to be the comparison between equilibrium costs of a player whose information set is
expanded. A natural weakness of using IBP to analyse the system as a whole is that it does not incorporate
any effects that the information expansion has on all players. From a mechanism design perspective, it is
more relevant to compare the social costs of the ICUEs. In this section, we define our own version of a
paradox, similar to that of IBP, and show that its occurrence is independent of network topology.
Define informational Braess’ paradox for the social cost (IBPSC) as the case when one type of player has
their information set strictly expanded which causes an increase to the social cost. IBP is a specific case of
IBPSC that occurs when information harms the informed player.
In order to consider how the social cost will change in an ICUE equilibrium, we need the following
proposition for the simplest circuit network: a two-node, two-edge ring most commonly referred to as the
Pigou network.
Proposition 4. Any two terminal network with at least two distinct paths has the Pigou network embedded
in it.
Proof. Suppose the statement is not true, then there does exist a network G with at least two distinct paths
which does not embed the Pigou network. Since a 2-edge ring is the simplest network that contains a cycle,
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any cyclic network must embed the 2-edge ring. Therefore, G is acyclic. Any acyclic undirected connected
network must be a tree. In a tree, the number of possible paths between any two pairs of nodes is necessarily
one. This contradicts the original statement.
Now we show that there will always be a set of cost functions for any network that allows for IBPSC to
occur.
Theorem 4. There exists an assignment of information sets and cost functions on any two-terminal network
such that IBPSC occurs.
Proof. In order for a network to have an IBPSC, at least one type of player must have an information set
as a strict subset of their resources. Therefore, at least two distinct strategies must exist. If there exists
two distinct strategies then, by Proposition 4, the network must have the Pigou network embedded in it.
Therefore, it suffices to show that there always exists an assignment of information sets and cost functions
on the Pigou network such that IBPSC exists. To show this, we will use Pigou’s example as shown in Figure
5.
Consider two populations with demands d1 = 1, d2 = 1. Suppose their information sets are E1 = {e1}
and E2 = {e1, e2} = E. Let ce1(x) = x and ce2(x) = 2. At equilibrium, type 1 will choose e1 and type 2
will choose e1 with a social cost of 3. Now, if we expand type 1’s information set to be E1 = {e1, e2} = E,
then since e1 costs strictly less than e2, type 1 will switch their strategy and the new equilibrium has social
cost of 4.
Despite its similarity with BP, the occurrence of IBPSC is actually independent of the topology of the
network. The IBPSC occurs because of the difference between the socially optimal cost and the cost of a
UE. By having the ability to assign information sets, an ICUE outcome can be found with a cost strictly less
than any UE. Any ICUE that is not a UE must be unstable as at least one player wishes to deviate from it
if they have their information set expanded. There will always exist an assignment of information sets for
any network where the social cost expands as information sets expand.
Theorem 5. Immunity to IBPSC is independent of network topology.
Since no two terminal network is immune to IBPSC, it is simple to extend the same observation for
multiple OD pairs. This result shows that there will always be an assignment of information sets and cost
functions that can create IBPSC.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have looked at the selfish routing games where individuals do not have perfect knowledge
of the network structure and how increasing their knowledge can affect the overall performance. Specifically,
we have identified a natural class of networks, i.e., rings, that are immune to performance deterioration,
which is known in the literature as informational Braess’ Paradox. This has settled a conjecture in [1]. We
have also shown that under simple alternative definition of performance, which is in line with the complete
information variant of Bress’ Paradox, all networks are resistant to such phenomenon.
We believe that the identification of safe network structure is bound to fundamentally impact the design
of transportation networks. A similar argument can be made for the simulation of traffic flow, as different
network structure will give rise to different behaviour by boundedly rational participants.
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